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Jeremy A. Thomas* International Law in Asia:
An Initial Review
I. Introduction
It is now a little over half a century since the first of the states of Asia to
be granted their independence in the aftermath of the Second World War
became sovereign and independent of their former colonial masters. In
that period there have been very substantial changes in international law.
The number of the family of nations has more than tripled and
international organisations and even individuals are now subject to the
application of international law. Space law, human rights and the law of
the environment have appeared, the law of the sea has been transformed,
disarmament has reappeared as a serious subject, the use of force banned,
in theory at least, and a new international legal order declared and these
are only some of the most obvious developments.
At the time the states of Asia attained independance it was doubted
whether their cultural outlook made them receptive to the fulfillment of
the norms of international law let alone its development and
embellishment. Henkin, for instance, in 1965, stated in respect of newly
independent states that they had "as yet no tradition of law observance
and that there were few pressures for law observance from opposition
parties, or from a critical press, or an enlightened public".,
Fifty years on it is perhaps an appropriate time to review whether the
states of Asia have been able to play a role in the post-war development
of international law, to consider how the considerable labours of Asian
scholars have led us to revise our understanding of the Asian contribution
to the formulation of international law and how the modern contribution
compares with Asia's historic contribution. Such a review may help us
identify a region of the world from which we may expect new ideas and
concepts to refresh and unify an increasingly fragmented discipline and
may be particularly timely at the beginning of a decade which has been
designated by the United Nations as the decade of international law and
which ends with as portentous an occasion as the beginning of the third
millenium. It is the intent of this writer to commence such a review in the
hope that others better equipped and with larger canvas may complete it.
* Jeremy A. Thomas, LL.B. (Lon), LL.M. (Dal), Assistant at Ashurst Morris Crisp of London,
England and Research Associate at Dalhousie Law School. The views expressed in this article
are those of the author and not necessarily those of Ashurst Morris Crisp.
1. Henkin, "International Law and the Behaviour of Nations" (1965), 114 Hague Recueil
181-2.
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However, before commencing it is worth advising the reader of the
definition of Asia used in this article. Northwards for our purposes Asia
stretches as far as Mongolia, China and Afghanistan and eastwards it
includes Pakistan. To the south it extends to the traditional states of South
East Asia and to the west it embraces Japan and Taiwan. The Asian
elements of Soviet Russia have been excluded as they lack a separate geo-
political existence and Iran has also been excluded because that nation,
for the purposes of international law, has stronger links with the Middle
East. Some readers' knowledgeable in the scholarly discussions of
geographers and historians as to the definition of Asia may find this
definition somewhat capricious, but for a lawyer it has the advantages of
clarity and certainty.
II. International Law in Asia in Ancient Times
(i) Introduction
Phenomena very much akin to those of contemporary international law
can be traced throughout antiquity. Perhaps the oldest of these, as
Nussbaum noted, is a treaty dated about the year 3100 B.C. between two
Mesopotamian cities whereby their common boundary was established.2
By the year 1200 B.C. the legal nature solemnity and form of treaties was
sufficiently well established in the consciousness of the Middle East that
Yahweh, in the terms recorded in the book of Deuteronomy, cast his
covenant with his people Israel in the form of a Near Eastern treaty.
3
During the Dual Monarchy, after Solomon, treaties were being used
for commercial purposes in addition to the traditional purposes of
alliance in war and to terminate wars and Jehoshaphat, King of Judea,
entered into a treaty with Ahaziah, King of Israel, to construct a fleet of
trading ships for trading purposes.4 Five hundred years on in the year 218
B.C., the Roman historian Livy recalls for us the legal arguments of the
Roman envoys before the Carthaginian Senate in respect of whether a
treaty was binding on a state when negotiated on its behalf, but without
its full authority at the advent of the Second Punic War.5
In Asia the labours of various Asian scholars, particularly those of
India, of which perhaps Chacko, Anand and most of all, Nagendra Singh,
are the most significant, have established that the phenomena of
contemporary international law also appeared in Asia from the earliest
recorded times. These scholars, particularly the latter, have also sought to
2. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (1958) p. 2.
3. See Thompson, Deuteronomy (1974) pp. 17-21 and the works there referred to.
4. 2 Chronicles 20: 35-37.
5. Livy, The War with Hannibal Radice (ed.) (1965), p. 41.
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rebut the traditional view of the historic development of international law
which has focused on the alleged development of the state. This view is
that though phenomena akin to contemporary international law
appeared prior to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the
international legal system in its present form appeared around the year
1638 with the Treaty of Westphalia and the establishment of the
sovereign state in Europe6. The corollary of this view is that as the
sovereign state did not appear in Asia until the mid twentieth century,
Asia was excluded from any part of the foundation of modern
international law.
The labours of these Asian scholars have demonstrated that
seventeenth century Europe was not the first time and place in history
that the world had seen the emergence of a series of sovereign states with
sufficient contact to develop something that looks akin to international
law. Singh affirms that in India "as early as the Vedic period (4000-
1000 B.C.) there were in existence separate political units sufficiently
independent of each other, each possessing an organ capable of
conducting intercourse with the others; and such units existed in sufficient
numbers to foster the growth of interstate law".
7
The question for us is what impact this early Asian interstate law has
on the development of contemporary international law?
(ii) The Phenomena of International Law in Asia
In India the most significant ancient period for the development of
international law arose after Alexander the Great's invasion left behind a
great number of Greek city states on the borders or inside India. Three
areas of the practice of international law have, in particular, been
identified. First, these states in their relations with each other and
surrounding states gave rise to substantial diplomatic practice and the
personage of a diplomat appears to have been considered inviolable.
Second, treaties were also entered into, and on the authority of Kautilya,
the ancient East's equivalent of Machiavilli, it appears that treaties were
regarded as binding between the parties and the equivalent of the pacta
sunt servarda principle was recognised. 8 Third, Judge Singh also suggests,
on the basis of various texts describing mythical events, that ancient India
had developed limits on the circumstance in which war could be waged
and had "highly developed system of laws and rules of war based on
6. See particularly Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948 in International Law and
Organization (1968) Falk (ed.) pp. 45-67.
7. Singh, "History of the Law of Nations Regional Developments: South and South East Asia"
(1984), 7Encyclopedia of Public Int Law 238.
8. Chacko, "International Law in India" (1960), 1 Indian J. Int Law 591-2.
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considerations of humanity and chivalry" and that "the distinct
contribution of this period (1900-1000 B.C.) was the formulation of the
laws of war".9 However, as Nussbaum noted, it seems unlikely that
mythical events were taken as prescriptive for future conduct and latter
practice seems to suggest that humanitarianism was no more prevalent in
the ancient East than it was elsewhere.' 0
Outside India the prevailing political circumstances and moral outlook
did not assist the development of international law. In China, for
instance, the states of which it was comprised were always treated as
subordinate to the ruling Emperor and would only obtain independence
of action at times when the central power was weak and in disarray as
in the Ch'un Chiu period of the Chou dynasty (722-481 B.C.). In this
period sophisticated codes of practice developed between the entities
comprising China relating to multi-party conferences (including a
disarmament conference) and treaties and the establishment of rules
pertaining to embassies. However, even in these circumstances, as one
commentator notes, the Emperor's "nominal rank was still recognised by
the feudal lords to some extent as a source of control ... a hierarchical
relationship based on higher and lower status" still remained."I
In respect of those states which lay outside her boundaries the Chinese
view that such states were barbarians meant that they could never be
"treated as independent states" with which relations based upon law
could develop. At different times, inter alia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam and
Burma were all tributary to China. Nevertheless, on occasion, when
absolutely necessary, China was willing to make treaties with the
"barbarians" such as the peace treaty of the year 200 B.C. with the
Huns.' 2 However, such treaties merely seem to indicate the well nigh
universality of the phenomena of international law throughout history
and as professor Chen notes, these isolated practices, principles and rules
never developed into a legal system.' 3
9. Singh, The Distinguishing Charactistics of the Concept of the Law of Nations as it
developed in Ancient India in Liber A micorum for Lord Wilberforce (1987), Brownlie & Bos
(eds.) p. 92 & 103.
10. Supra, note 2 p. 4.
11. Iriye, "The Principles of International Law in the Light of Confiucian Doctrine" (1967),
120 Hague Receui 7.
12. Miyazaki, "History of the Law of Nations Regional Developments: Far East" (1984), 7
Encyclopedia of Public Int Law 216.
13. Chen, "The People's Republic of China and Public International Law" (1984), 8
Dalhousie LJ. 3.
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(iii) The Impact of the Ancient Practice of International Law in Asia on
Contemporary International Law
It is very difficult to show that the phenomena of international law that
emerged in ancient Asia had any significant impact on the development
of modern international law. Although there is a "degree of similarity
between several of the ancient Indian state principles and usages of
modern international law"' 4 jurists in only a few instances have suggested
that ancient Asian practice has had real impact on the formulation of
contemporary international law.
Although phenomena of international law have appeared throughout
history it is to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe that the
origins of contemporary international law have been, it is submitted
correctly, traced. However, the reason for this is not so much because the
period witnessed the appearance of the sovereign state, as is traditionally
thought because sovereign states as we have seen had long existed in the
Middle East, the Mediterranean world 5 and in Asia, but for reasons
connected with the development of commerce, politics (including the
further development of the state), religion, communications and the
intellectual development of mankind in Europe.
Perhaps the first person to realise that the middle centuries of the
second millenium after Christ had seen the emergence of a fundamentally
different international legal system in Europe was Martens writing in the
latter part of the eighteenth century. In his view, on many points of
international law, "no information can be obtained by going further than
the time of Henry the Great, or the Treaty of Westphalia or even the
Beginning of the Present Century". Emphasising the long term
importance of the introduction of Christianity "and of the hierarchical
system" the contemporary underlying reasons that he thought had given
rise to such marked developments in international law were the discovery
of America and of passage to the East Indies, the growth in permanent
embassies (unlike modern commentators he did not emphasise the
importance of the Treaty of Westphalia because in his view sovereign
states had for long existed).' 6 To this list we might also add, in an era
when all legal systems suffer from a surfeit of paper, the perfection of the
printing press.
One further factor for the development of international law in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which Martens did not mention was
14. Supra; note 8 p. 185.
15. See Ago, "The First Communities in the Mediterranean World" (1982), 53 British
Yearbook InL Law 213.
16. Martens, Law of Nations (1795) p. 6.
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the intellectual achievement of Europe embodied in the development of
the theory and doctrine of international law. This commenced under the
pen of the Spanish jurists such as Vitoria and later, the protestant jurists
such as Gentili and Grotius. Their works were important because they
were of a codificatory nature of the existing practices of international law,
bringing together for the first time the full plethora of rules, practices and
precedents of states ancient and modern. Appearing at the time when
growing interstate intercourse required legal guidance these works
provided in a tangible and accessible form precepts of international law
and were ensured recognition by reason of the prestige attaching to the
author's name. It may be possible to trace the practices of international
law back long before the publicists,' 7 but they presented these previously
isolated practices in a form capable of systematic development and which
development, with the benefit of the printing press, has continued since
as the religious, political and commercial forces that Martens noted have
generally continued to operate.
As we look through the works of Grotius and his predecessors such as
Gentili and even later writers such as Bynkershoeck and Vattel, their
methodology shows how little they were influenced by Asian practice.
The publicists were strongly influenced by Christianity and were natural
lawyers. They believed that God, as a God of order, had laid down rules
for the conduct of states just as he had for individuals and that these could
be found from biblical precedents and the best practices of the ancients.
There was a right course of conduct and a wrong one, and ultimately, for
the monarch, to whom many of these works were addressed, judgement
before God. The relativism of the East was missing.
The great storehouses for these writers from which principles to guide
the practice of states could be elaborated were history, theology,
philosophy and law. Whether it was ancient history, or biblical history
and theology or Roman law or the Mosaic law, it was from these sources
that the doctrines of international law were crafted and in light of which
the practices of states were judged. For instance, Gentili, when seeking to
establish the legality under the law of nations of treaties with states of
differing religions pointed, inter alia, to the Treaty of Friendship between
Solomon and Hiram of Tyre and one between Solomon's father David
and the King of the Ammonites found in the Bible.' 8 However, when
these writers went to ancient history to establish or test a point of law
they went to Greek or Roman history and in the case of biblical history,
17. For the contribution of central and eastern Europe see Lachs, The Teacher and
International Law (1982).
18. Gentili, De Jure Belli Liri Tres (1612) p. 658.
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to the practices primarily of the Jews and of Semitic peoples and not to
the practices of Asia.
This is not to say that ancient Asian practice was never referred to by
the early publicists of international law. Indeed commentators have noted
the reference by Grotius' to Alexander the Great's adoption of Indian
practices relating to the laws of war, but such references are very isolated
in the literature of international law and would appear .to have been
derived from classical European sources rather than Asian. Grotius, for
instance, was well aware of Plutarch's analysis of Alexander's Indian
Campaign and probably also of that of Arrian.' 9 The lack of recourse of
the publicists to Asian texts should not surprise us for the early writers of
international law could only produce their work from the sources then
available and histories of Asia even in Asia were either unavailable or
unwritten. As has been noted "prior to the British historiographers were
mostly Muslims"' 20 whose works were anecdotal and inevitably not
known in Europe. The works that survived the centuries were of an
intellectual and literary nature and even today when the writing of the
Asian history has become a major growth industry in countries such as
India the material to create an authentic history is lacking and Asian
scholars have relied heavily on the activities of the Hindu gods in ancient
legends and myths to illustrate Asian practices.2'
It is indeed in Asia's approach to history that we find perhaps the
principle reason for her failure to contribute to the development of
modern international law in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The
great religions of Asia, Buddhism, Confucianism and particularly
Hinduism did not rely on history as an essential part of their validity. The
thoughts and doctrines of Confucius and the Budda are independent of
their lives and had they not existed the ideas they articulated would not
diminish and the origins of Hinduism are lost deep in time. As religions
they are very unlike Christianity, which is rooted in history, being the
history of God calling a people to himself, first from the Jews and then
the Gentiles and finding the completion of this process in the life, death
and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Although it is fashionable in the last
century and a half to doubt the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth it was not
at the time when the scholastics wrote, when Gentili fled Italy from the
Inquisition and Grotius joined Jacob Arminius in his dispute with the
successors to Calvin. For them the treaty practices of Solomon and the
people of Israel during the Exodus were authentic. The legendary and
19. See Sandifer, "Reading Grotius in the year 1940" (1940), 34Am. J. Int. Law 459.
20. Spear, A History ofIndia (1965) Vol. 2 p. 11.
21. Supra, note 8, p. 185.
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mythical nature of the sources that would have been available in Asia
would not have had a strong appeal to men with the mind set of Grotius
or Vitoria even had they known of them.
The one principle though that Indian scholars have emphasised as
representing the unique contribution of ancient India to international law
is the "universality of its application, irrespective of limitations of
religion, civilisation or political character". Further, it is submitted that
Christendom, the cradle of modern international law, by the principle
that "nothing of a binding nature could govern the relations of a Christian
state with a non Christian State, did lasting damage to the correct concept
of international law, which recognises political entities irrespective of
their religious beliefs."
'22
Such an analysis, however, to this writer, seems to considerably
overstate the case. Although it may be true that Indian society has not
been marked by the division of society into religious or national groups,
although recent disturbances suggest that this may not necessarily be so,
the human failure manifested in nearly all societies by the need to
discriminate against other peoples and religions was met in Hindu society
by a different form of discrimination, the caste system. For instance, upon
the conquest of India, around 800 B.C. by the Aryans, society was
divided vertically and the native Dasas were treated as beyond the social
pale. "This vertical division of society made it easier in later centuries to
accept new ethnic groups" as Dr. Thapar has noted. "Each new group to
arrive in India took on the characteristics of a separate sub-caste and was
thereby assimilated into the larger caste system. '23 It thus appears that the
universality of the East appears to be quite different from the universality
which has come to prevail in international law with its emphasis on
equality and independence.
Further, to this writer, it seems that international law derived its
emphasis upon universality from its Christian heritage. Vitoria, as we will
see, maintained that differences in religion and the extension of empire
were not just causes for war.24 Such plain speaking was to offend both
Pope and Emperor. Grotius and Selden, as we shall also shortly see also
both made use of the practices of non Christian peoples to support their
views so long as such peoples had obtained a minimal level of civilisation.
Although it is true there were debates over the legality of entering into
22. Supra; note 7, p. 239.
23. Thapar, A History of India (1966) Vol. 1 p. 38-39. Others have noted that Hindu law is
based on inequality, see Bozman cited in Cassese, "The Concept of Law Upheld by Western
Societies and Developing Countries", [ 1983] Hague Recuell Colloquy 323.
24. Supra, note 18 p. 200, however, a just cause of war was to terminate cannibalism.
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treaties with the Turk in the works of the early fathers of international
law, the discussion is not in the context of whether Christian states can
rely upon the beliefs of the other party to regard the treaty as non-
binding, but whether entering into the treaty per se is a breach of
international law committed by Christian states against the other
members. At a time when Turkey fully embraced the concept of Jehad
against the West and the necessity of success at the battle of Lepanto was
still well within living memory, such a view is understandable. It also
seems that not withstanding this threat, treaties of a commercial nature,
even with the Turk, were considered binding.2 5 It appears only with the
coming of positivism in the latter half of the nineteenth century did
international law surrender universalism.
III. The contribution of Asia to International Law 1600 - 1914
(i) Introduction
An assessment of the contribution of Asian states to international law in
the period from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the First
World War requires answers to two principal questions. First, at this
time, were the states of Asia members of the family of nations? Second,
if the former can be answered in the affirmative what special doctrines or
practices did they contribute to international law?
(ii) Position of Asian States in the Family of Nations
The question of whether the states of Asia were members of the family
of nations at the beginning of the seventeenth century is a matter on
which views differ.
The traditional and most popular view is that international law is the
creation of the Christian mind in Europe. In the words of the learned
Oppenheim "there is no doubt that the Law of Nations is a product of
Christian civilisation. It originally arose between states of Christendom
only, and for hundreds of years was confined to these states". 26 However,
he went on to note that the family of nations was, at the beginning of the
twentieth century, embracing non European and non-Christian states as
such states attained to the level of civilisation enjoyed by the Christian
states of Europe.
According to Oppenheim in his classification of the members of the
family of nations in 1905, "in Asia only Japan is a full and real member
of the Family of Nations, Persia, Korea, China, Siam and Tibet are, for
25. Ibid, p. 658.
26. Oppenheim, International Law, (1905), 1st ed. p. 30.
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some parts, only within the Family". Further, Japan could not long trace
its ancestry in the family of nations and "some years ago" Oppenheim
tells us "one might have doubted whether Japan was a full and real
member of that family" but "through marvellous efforts Japan has
become not only a modern state but an influential power". 27 At the same
time, according to Oppenheim there were seventy two European States
who were members of the family of nations and twenty one in America.
The states of Asia were excluded from the family of nations not on
grounds of race or religion but civilisation. It was, however, confidently
assumed that "with the progress of civilisation" the non European states
"will become sooner or later International Persons in the full sense of the
term". 28 Indeed, in the next half century, as we shall see, successive
editors of Oppenheim would dedicate a substantial portion of the text
book to noting and setting forth the extent of the progress of that
civilisation as new states were admitted to the family of nations.
The text books noted the difficulty of defining the exact amount of
civilisation necessary for a state to be considered a member of the family
of nations. For instance Lawrence, writing in his text book of 1895,
seems to have no doubt that China was a full member of the family of
nations.29 The essence of an uncivilised state was one that was unwilling
or unable to fulfil its international treaty commitments or protect the lives
of foreign citizens and their property. Accordingly, uncivilised states were
subject to capitulations by civilised states whereby the latter were granted
jurisdiction over their own nationals and their property resident in an
uncivilised state.30
Admission to the family of nations required not only the establishment
of Western forms of civilisation, but recognition by the existing members
that the requisite standard of civilisation had been attained. Such
recognition could be given formally by treaty, as in the case of Turkey to
Clause 7 of the Treaty of Paris 1856. Alternatively, it could be given by
an agreement to withdraw the capitulations. For instance, the admission
of Japan seems to have been less formal and rested on her adoption of
Western practices which, in 1894, led to the Aoki-Kimberly Treaty
whereby the United Kingdom renounced its extraterritorial rights in
Japan and similar treaties were shortly thereafter entered into by Japan
with other Western Powers.
Therefore in one view, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was
not thought that the states of Asia were longstanding members of the
27. Ibid, p. 33.
28. INd, p. 149.
29. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (1895) p. 58.
30. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (1894) p. 10 2.
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Family of Nations. Only Japan, of the Asian states, had a clear place in
the Family of Nations and she was a new, if precocious, member. China,
Siam and Korea, who was soon to lose her independence, were seen as
international progeny of somewhat dubious parentage. In the course of
time it was expected that such states and other Asian peoples would gain
a place in the Family of Nations upon the attainment of a level of
civilisation which was sufficient to guarantee the fulfilment of
international obligations and the recognition of such by the members of
the Family of Nations. Such a time had not yet, however, arrived.
A different view of the extent to which non European states were
members of the Family of Nations in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries was reached by the Polish born jurist Professor Alexandrowicz.
Alexandrowicz argued that in the early years of Asian-European contact
the parties regulated their relations on the basis of international law and
concluded his seminal work "An Introduction to the History of the Law
of Nations in the East Indies" with the words that "when European states
first sailed to the East Indies (meaning here India, Ceylon, Burma, Siam
and the Indonesian islands) a confrontation of two worlds took place on
a footing of equality and the ensuing commercial and political
transactions, far from being in a legal vacuum, were governed by the law
of nations as adjusted to local inter-state custom".
31
In his analysis Professor Alexandrowicz pointed out that the jurists of
the day, Grotius and Freitas, in their dispute over a nation's rights over
the high seas32 and their rights to occupy East Indian lands, both accepted
that the states of Asia were protected by international law and any
interference with their territory or rights required legal justification. Both
jurists accepted that the Portugese had no legal right to occupy East
Indian lands based on rights of discovery or occupation or prescription
because both agreed that none of these doctrines were applicable where
a land was already occupied, regardless of who the occupier was and
where it lay. Where the two differ is that Freitas argued that Papal
donation and the spread of Christianity justified European occupation.
However, it is only on this one limited ground that Portugal was
permitted, in Freitas's view, to intervene in the affairs of Asian states.
There was no general right to use force in Asia at ones' discretion because
international law applied to regulate the use of force.
The differences between the postulates common to Grotius and Freitus
and those of the early twentieth century writers are clearly brought out by
31. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of Law of Nations in the East Indies (1967)
p. 224.
32. See Grotius, Mare Liberus (1608) and Freitus, De Justo Imperio Lusitandrum Asiatico
(1625).
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an examination of Oppenheim. Writing of, inter alia, China, Korea and
Siam he notes that "though for certain parts they are recognised as
international persons they remain, as yet, outside the Circle of the Family
of Nations, especially with regard to war and they are, for those parts,
treated by Christian powers according to discretion", 33 which discretion
for Oppenheim meant annexation.
In addition, to fortify his argument that political and commercial
transactions took place under the law of nations in the East Indies
Professor Alexandrowicz points to a substantial number of treaties that
were entered into during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries between
European and Asian states. Treaties of alliance were entered into, such as
that in 1547, between the King of Portugal and the leading Hindu
Kingdom of the period, Vijayanagar, against Muslim Bijapur. Others
dealt with the transfer of territory, such as the treaty of 1779 between
Portugal and the Marathas, the validity of which the International Court
of Justice has considered and a great number of treaties were entered into
of a commercial nature.
The explanation suggested by Professor Alexandrowicz for the
establishment of the view that international law in the seventeenth
century was confined to Europe is "the replacement of the natural law
ideology by positivism" 34 in the early nineteenth century. According to
him the emphasis at this time on the practice of European states "meant
the reduction of non European state entities which had enjoyed a full
legal status within the pre-nineteenth century Family of Nations to the
position of candidates for admission to its membership or for recognition
by the founder members of the European community of States". 35 This
view seems to be reflected by the literature for, by the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, writers were referring to both international
law and "the European and American Code of international law".36 With
the development of the weight of European practice it appears that what
former generations took to be European or American international law
became recognised as international law and the doctrines and concepts
that had been known as "international law" disappeared from the
literature.
The attack of Professor Alexandrowicz on the traditional view of the
European exclusivity of the early members of the Family of Nations has
33. Supr, note 26 p. 149.
34. Supra; note 31 p. 9.
35. bid, note p. 10.
36. Kent, Commentary on International Law (1866) Abdy (ed.) p. 11; Martens, Law of
Nations (1795) p. 4.
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been met by Gong. Gong's thesis is that "there never was a primordial,
universal Family of Nations" but that only "paradoxically" through the
elaboration of the civilisation standard did the Family of Nations become
"universal for the first time". 37 Gong rests his thesis on the argument that
the states of China, Siam and Japan were closed to Europe in the
seventeenth century and that it was the application of the civilisation
standard in the nineteenth century that brought them into the
international legal system whereby the Family of Nations became truly
international. Gong's thesis applied to international law, rather than to
the development of a truly international political system where it belongs,
results in a very inaccurate assessment of the participation of Asian states
in international law. Gong does not deny the universalism of Grotius and
others but suggests that their views were "based more on the conceptions
of European theorists, than on the realities of sustained contact among
the members of the world".
38
Although he is right to emphasise the degree of contact between
European and Asian states for the purpose of ascertaining whether they
formed an international system (his definition of an international legal
system is, after all, "when two or more states have sufficient contact
between them and have sufficient contact on one another's decisions to
cause them to behave - at least in some measure - as parts of a
whole") the need for contact between all European and Asian states is
not necessary for the establishment that, as a matter of legal doctrine,
international law did acknowledge Asian states if such relations as did
exist were predicted on the equality of nations. There is no reason to
suggest that had China, Japan and Siam been more accessible to
Europeans international law would have applied precepts other than
those it applied in the East Indies. Indeed Gong does not attempt to refute
the solid body of interstate practice the Alexandrowicz adduces to
illustrate the universalism of seventeenth century international law.
Further, Gong fails to note that seventeenth century international
lawyers made use of the concept of civilisation in a different way to their
nineteenth century brethren to identify the nations whose practices were
to be relied upon for establishing the doctrines of international law.
Selden, for instance, in his classic work Mare Clausaum affirms the right
of nations to appropriate the seas by the "natural permissive law derived
out of the customs and constitutions of the more civilised and more noble
nations both ancient and modern". He then carries out an encyclopedic
37. Gong, The Standard of Civilisation in International Society (1984) pp. 44-45.
38. Ibid, p. 3.
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survey "of the more civilised and more noble nations of the past and
present age and of such whose customs we are best acquainted with".39
The practices of such "civilised nations includes Egypt, Syria and Persia
in addition to European ones. Although Selden makes no reference to the
practices of Asian states this may be because they were not ones he was
"best acquainted with" or more likely that as the sovereignty over the
seas was unknown in Asia her practice was more conveniently ignored.
It is clear though that by reference to the practices of Middle Eastern
nations, for Selden, civilisation did not mean exclusively the civilisation
of Europe, as it did for nineteenth century international lawyers and that
further, there was a residue category of nations whose practices (because
of the paucity of their civilization) could not constitute precedents of
international law. It was this residue category which later writers would
expand to exclude Asian states from the Family of Nations.
It should not surprise us that European nations of the period were
willing to apply legal standards and to enter into relations with Asian
states on the grounds of equality. The environment in which these states
grew was fundamentally legalistic in which the great day when God
would judge the living and the dead was vitally alive. If God was to judge
all peoples on the same terms what right had Europe to treat these
peoples as unfit for intercourse? Thus, when European nations first met
in the Americas one of the first things the King of Spain was to do was
to ask scholars, such as Vitoria, how relations with the natives were to be
conducted.
Similarly, when Europe went to Asia it was generally willing to treat
it with equality. The difference between South America and Asia
however was that the great biblical testimony of St. Paul that "all have
sinned and fallen short of the glory of God" 40 was proved true, as
principles gave way to greed more quickly in South America than Asia
due to the restraint imposed on human passions by the latters more
developed military and economic prowess. It was not until the mid-
nineteenth century that European military ascendancy in Asia was
complete and until that time Asia remained part of the Family of
Nations.
(iii) The Contribution of Asian States to International Law
Significant contributions by Asian states to the corpus of international
law are hard to discern in the period running from 1600 to 1914, with
perhaps one or two isolated exceptions.
39. Selden, Mare Clausaum (1952) p. 42.
40. Romans 3:23.
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Although Europeans considered the law of nations applicable to Asian
states, such states at a philosophical level were not equipped to make a
lasting contribution to the development of international law at the time.
The undergirding philosophical base of the international law of the era,
although towards the end of the era it was to diminish, was the law of
nature which had its derivation in the monotheism of Judea-Christianity
and its belief that God was the maker of heaven and earth and of all
mankind and that God, whose revealed nature did not change, would
have created an orderly world, the laws of which would be universal and
discoverable. Such a postulate, as Professor Ito, has noted in the context
of nineteenth century Japan was not one which Asian states could
naturally identify with and develop. 41 Although Europeans might
consider that international law was applicable to all states, the notion that
there was a universal law binding on all states was foreign in large parts
of Asia where Japan under the Shogunate was closed to the West and
where the Universal Monarchy of China looked upon "all outside states
as vassals or barbarians".
42
Further, the chief instruments by which the doctrines of international
law were propagated were European. The role of the publicist in the
development of international law should not be minimised and Grotius,
Bynkershoek, Wolff, Pufendorf and Vattel, to name but only a few of the
most prominent publicists, along with their colleagues, were all
European. It was their belief, in the possibility that the totality of
international relations could be rendered subject to law that laid the
foundations of the present day international legal system and the belief in
its systematic development in accordance with the development of
society. It is, as we have seen, also striking that the sources and precedents
that these writers used in compiling their works were almost drawn
exclusively from European of Middle Eastern sources.
Perhaps just as significant for the contribution of Asia to the
international law of the latter half of the nineteenth century was its failure
to participate fully in the great second wave of industrialisation that
swept over Europe in the middle decades of the century. By 1850 the
long struggle from a rural to an industrial society was complete in
Western Europe and as Cipolla has remarked "the past was not only past
it was dead".43 In Western Europe a new world had appeared, a world
sustained by industrial production, which utilised mechanical power in
vast quantities, which systematically applied science to help solve its
41. Ito, "One Hundred Years of International Law Studies in Japan," [1969] Japanese
Yearbook Int Law 22.
42. Panikkar, Asia and Western Domination (1953) p. 126.
43. Cipolla, The Emergence ofIndustrial Societies (1973) p. 9.
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problems which needed and created a well developed system of
communications and which throve upon the factory system, capital and
urbanisation.
This new world made new demands on its international law. Its
problems and concerns were not parochial, but worldwide and to meet
these demands there emerged in the 1860's the "multipartite, law making,
open and organisational treaties," as well as the new type of international
"conferences" which Professor Nussbaum believes led to the sixth decade
of the nineteenth century seeing "the birth of a new era of international
law".44 Amongst the most important of these treaties were the Geneva
Convention of 1864 for the protection of the wounded, the International
Convention on International Freight Traffic of 1890, the International
Sanitary Convention of 1903, the Cobden Treaty of 1860 for trade and
those creating the Universal Telegraphic Union of 1865, the General
Postal Union in 1874 and the International Office of Public Health of
1907. These conventions although often ratified at latter dates by the
states of Asia all took place without their central involvement and the
states of Asia were therefore little able to contribute to the formulation of
the new procedures for the creation of international law that were
appearing.
This irreversible trend in Western Europe to industrialisation after
1850 also gave rise to greatly increased military might and the ability and
confidence to subject very distant nations to the will of the metropolitan
state. This confidence in turn, in the righteousness in what states did, gave
rise to legal positivism which, as we have seen, did much to encourage
the disinheritance by international law of its earlier progeny. From the
1860's onwards there was a great scramble by the European states to
obtain as colonies the territories of Asia. In 1884 the French annexed
Indo China and in 1893 followed that up with the annexation of Laos
while the annexation of Burma was completed in 1886 by the British.
Throughout this period there was a nibbling at the edges of China.
If there were strong reasons militating against a contribution by Asia
to international law between 1600 and 1914 what contributions were
there?
Perhaps the first we might mention is in the context of the law of the
sea. It appears that the doctrine of the freedom of the seas was applied in
the Indian Ocean at the time of the inception of international law and
Alexandrowicz suggests that "Grotius either conceived or perfected his
doctrine of the freedom of the sea under the influence of maritime
44. Supra, note 2 p. 202.
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traditions prevailing in the East".45 Indeed Anand submits that "the
freedom of the seas not only existed long before Grotius was ever heard
of or before Europe appeared as a formidable force on the international
stage, but was actually being practised without any question in the
sixteenth century by Asian countries".
46
However, although it may be true that Asian states did not seek to
control the seas, as even Anand admits, the freedom of the seas as a
doctrine of law, rather than usage had to await the appearance of Grotius.
Though Grotius may have been influenced by the practices of the nations
surrounding the area of his interest the authorities that he cites are almost
exclusively classical or biblical or European. Indeed, the foundation
argument of Grotius for the freedom of the seas is that "specific and
unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or
first principle, the spirit of which is self evident or immutable, to wit;
Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it".
47
Such a principle, may to the mind of the modern international lawyer
imbued as it is with concepts of state sovereignty be inconceivable as a
fundamental and overriding rule of law but in the seventeenth century it
was this rule by extrapolation upon which was to be based the main
argument for the freedom of the seas.
Another area of Asian involvement was the law of neutrality. In 1864
Prussia seized three Danish ships carrying Chinese goods and upon
arguing that she was a neutral, China received compensation in
accordance with the law of the times. An incident which attracted much
greater attention from international lawyers and which again involved
the law of neutrality occurred during the Sinno-Japanese war of 1894-5
when the Japanese sank the Kowshing, a British ship carrying Chinese
soldiers. This created quite a stir in the western press, but the action was
held to be justified in international law and Westlake argued, in writing,
firmly in the favour of the Japanese. Although neither of these matters
were of major significance to the law of neutrality they were all part of
the incidents and events which went to constitute the fabric of the law.
The most significant contribution however to the future development
of international law was the example provided by Japan of the possibility
of membership to the Family of Nations when membership required
close blood ties to Europe. In the 40 odd years that separated the arrival
of Commodore Perry's celebrated Black Ships off the coast of Japan and
her victory over China in 1895, Japan moved from being a state almost
45. Supra, note 31 p. 229.
46. Anand, Development of the Law of the Sea (1983) p. 226.
47. Grotius, Mare Liberum (1608) p. 7.
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unknown to European civilisation to the only full Asian member of the
Family of Nations, only the second state with a non European or non
Christian heritage and unlike Turkey she was not historically well known
in Europe and perhaps most strikingly, she had done so by reason of her
own "marvellous efforts" and thus, by example emphasised the scope for
the future extension of membership of the Family of Nations to all states.
Furthermore, Japan had become "one of the Great Powers that lead the
Family of Nations".
The emergence of Japan as a member of the Family of Nations was
the result of a definite decision by her leadership to develop Japan
politically and economically along Western lines in order, partly at least,
to fulfil the standards inherent in the civilisation test for membership of
the Family of Nations. Representative political institutions were
established, the legal system reformed and modern industries established.
Having commenced these developments Japan set about the definite
strategy of negotiating with the Great Powers for the removal of the
capitulations which nineteenth century wisdom regarded as the symbol of
an inferior or at best different civilisation. In 1894 Japan by the Aoki-
Kimberly Treaty with Great Britain after 25 years of trying succeeded in
obtaining the agreement of a Great Power to the lifting of its
extraterritorial rights and this treaty was to be the precedent for the future
revision of her unequal treaties with the Great Powers.
Nevertheless, although the methods by which Japan became a
member of the Family of Nations was an example to other non European
states such as Siam, it was an example which other states, excluded from
the Family of Nations, found difficult to emulate. Japan did not
campaign for any radical restructuring of the Family of Nations to widen
its membership, but seems to have been content to adopt its existing
precepts and in many ways was a model member.
The latter half of the nineteenth century saw great strides forward
beginning with the Geneva Conventions in the legal controls on the use
of force by states once a war had broken out. These rules were applied
most rigorously by the Japanese in their wars with China in 1895 and
Russia in 1905 to the considerable commendation of the commentators.
E E. Smith and Sibley, for instance, wrote of her conduct in the war of
1905 that "Throughout the war her attitude has been one of intelligent
correctness "giving nothing away" in the current phrase but taking no
liberties with accepted international practice" 48. In addition, Japan
attended both the International Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 at
48. Smith & Sibley, International Law as Interpreted During the Russo Japanese War (1905)
p. 8.
International Law in Asia
the Hague and signed and ratified all the Conventions that resulted, but
she rejected the suggestion to settle disputes by means of compulsory
arbitration although it appears that the combination of Germany and
Austria-Hungary were the primary protagonists in resistence to this
concept.49 Nevertheless, Japan was the defendant in the Japanese House
Tax Arbitration Case, the third case to come before the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in which Great Britain, France and Germany alleged that
a tax imposed on buildings in Japan was in breach of the treaties
whereby their extra territorial rights had been terminated. The Court
found against Japan and as a consequence she refrained "for many years
from referring international disputes to arbitration". 50
In many other ways Japan appeared the conservative. By a treaty of
1876 she imposed an unequal treaty on Korea by which means she
obtained extraterritorial rights and as with similar rights obtained by the
Great Powers in similar situations this proved to be the precursor to the
complete annexation of Korea in 1910. Accordingly, Korea, although a
participant of the First Hague Peace Conference, was not to participate
in the Second Peace Conference. In respect of the limit to the territorial
sea Japan upheld the traditional three mile limit and generally allied her
interest with those of the traditional maritime states.
International law was the first European legal system introduced to
Japan 1. As early as 1862 Amane Nishi was despatched to the University
of Leyden to study, inter alia, international law under Professor Vissering.
In the years that followed interest in international law grew rapidly and
as early as 1897 the "Association of International Law of Japan" was
founded and in 1902 it began publishing a monthly periodical which
between 1912 and 1940 was the only international law journal published
in the Orient recognised by the Carnegie Endowment. The opinions of
Japanese jurists in respect of international law also, as Professor Ito has
noted, tended to reflect the prevailing world views, "especially those of
European academic circles".52
In these early years the Japanese were naturally concerned with
establishing what existing international law was and many of the
standard treatises of the day were translated such as Woolsey's
"Introduction to the Study of International Law" and Kent's
"Commentaries on International Law". However, undoubtedly the most
49. Higgins, The Peace Conjerences (1909) p. 84.
50. Miyazaki, "Japanese House Tax Arbitration Case" (1981), 2 Encyclopedia of Public Int.
Law 155.
51. Otsuka, "Japan's Early Encounter with the Concept of the Law of Nations" (1969), 13
The Japanese Yearbook InL Law 43.
52. Supra, note 41 p. 31.
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influential work of the period was Wheaton's "Elements of International
Law" which was first translated into Chinese in 1864 and in 1865 was
reprinted in Japan. Wheaton's work was the subject of a series of
commentaries and it has been said that "the translations of the treatises of
other scholars were published for the better understanding of
Wheaton"1 3 Perhaps the first native author of real significance was Dr.
Sakue Takahashi whose works on international law during the Chino-
Japanese war attracted a wider audience and in particular the attention
of Westlake and Holland 54.
IV. International Law in Asia 1914-1939
(i) Introduction
The First World War was, despite its title, primarily a European war. It
started in Europe, its main antagonists were European, its great battles
were fought there, and all the main fronts, with the exception of the
Middle East were located in its geographical confines. Outside Europe,
wherever significant combat took place, the combatants were European
or financed or armed by Europeans, with the exception of Japan who
limited her role to seizing the isolated German possessions in the Pacific.
Although, symbolically for the future, at the request of the hard pressed
British Admiralty the Japanese despatched a squadron of her excellent
navy to the Mediterranean for escort duties. Thus it was that the great
changes in international law, which can be traced back to the war years,
continued greatly to reflect European developments and initiatives.
Nevertheless, the First World War by its end had drastically altered the
distribution of power in the world and its aftermath provided a definite
opportunity for the states of Asia to assert themselves on the world stage
for a number of reasons. First, it delivered a severe blow to the moral
confidence that Europeans had in their civilisation and accordingly in the
justice of judging nations in accordance with whether they subscribed to
a form of civilisation identical or compatible with the West. As Dr. Spear
has noted in the context of India "here were the Western mentors of the
East engaged in a fratricidal struggle and accusing each other of atrocities
which they had taught Indians to believe were confined in modern times
to their own country. 55
Second, the Western Allies had incurred a moral debt to many Asian
states and their own colonial possessions. For instance both China and
53. Ibid, p. 21.
54. See Takahashi, Cases on International Law During the Chino-Japanese War (1899).
55. Supra, note 20 p. 182.
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Siam had fought against Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in
a conflict from which they might have stayed apart and India had raised
over 1,200,000 men for the services of the United Kingdom.
Third, the appearance of Soviet Russia and its advocacy of old
principles applied to new circumstances, such as the principles of
territorial inviolability, non-intervention and non-aggression and its
proclamation of principles, such as the right to self determination and the
invalidity of unequal treaties and treaties subject to a fundamental change
of circumstances, brought into being for the first time a traditional Great
Power whose interests, at least ostensibly, were not identifiable with the
continuation of the traditional norms of international law.
Fourth, America emerged as the creditor of Europe and ultimate
arbiter of the victorious Western Alliance and in doing so, along with the
appearance of Soviet Russia, shifted the world balance of power away
from Europe. This was particularly important because America, unlike
Europe, had no important colonies to preserve in Asia and accordingly,
as President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points was to show, she was
sympathetic to the aspirations of colonial territories for self
determination.
However, as we will see, the outworkings of these new factors did not
lead to as full a participation in the Family of Nations as might have been
expected and the war and interwar years may, perhaps, be seen as a
transitional period for Asia.
(ii) Membership of Asian States in the Family of Nations
The post war years saw a gentle increase in the Asian members of the
Family of Nations. Japan remained as the one Asian Great Power, but by
1928 the edition of Oppenheim's textbook of that year acknowledged in
its classification of the number and standing of the states of the world that
in Asia both China and Siam were full members of the international
community and that there was no longer any doubt about their
membership. Further, Afghanistan had been added to their number as
was Nepal by the date of the next edition of the work in 1937. In
addition, Mongolia and Tibet were recognised as half sovereign states and
in a footnote it was stated that they were "nominally ... regarded as
being under the protection of China, but that the former or part of it has
some connection with the Russian Union of Socialist Republics". 56 This,
though, was perhaps a conservative view, at least as regards Tibet, for as
56. Oppenheim, International Law (1928) 4th ed. p. 233.
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a recent commentator notes "there is overwhelming evidence that Tibet
had become an independent state by this time".57
These new additions to the Family of Nations were the result of the
lessening in the influence of the Western concept of civilisation in
international law in the face of the inconsistencies in its use that were
beginning to appear. International lawyers of the time regarded that the
rules of war had been shattered in "indiscriminate shootings, outrages and
burnings in Belgium". The cause in one word was German "rightful-
ness".58 If Germany, an allegedly "civilised" state could act in such a way
how could a distinction on grounds of civilisation be made with the states
of Asia, many of whom had fought on the side of civilisation? The
question was not one that contemporaries found easy to answer.
It was not that the capitulations ceased to exist, but that they ceased to
be a symbol of a state's level of civilisation and of proof that it was not
a full member of the Family of Nations. From the nineteen twenties it
was clear that China and Siam were members of the international
community and yet extraterritorial rights over those states remained, save
for those of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire whose rights
were abolished after the First World war. Extraterritorial rights were only
finally removed in the case of Siam in 1939 and China in 1943 in
recognition of the latters contribution to the Allied war effort in the
Second World War.
It is true that civilisation as the means of membership to the Family of
Nations can still be found in the textbooks of the period. Indeed, almost
as a final flourish the concept of civilisation as a concept of international
law was put to use in new fields. Article 38 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice referred to the "general
principles of law recognised by civilised states" as a source of
international law to which the Court was to give effect and the mandate
system described the tutelage of the "advanced nations" as a "sacred trust
of civilisation". However, the implication of the expression "civilisation"
had changed.
The principle of self determination does not yet seem to have had
substantial effect to increase the membership of Asian states to the family
of nations. As Brownlie has noted, "the diplomacy of the years 1918 to
1924 in Europe evidenced reluctance on the part of many states to accept
the principle as prescriptive for future conduct".5 9 Although in Eastern
57. Fawcett, "General Course on Public International Law" (1971), 132(1) Hague Recuei
433.
58. Lawrence, The Society ofNations (1918) p. 7.
59. Brownlie, "An Essay on the History of the Principle of Self Determination" Grotian
Society Papers, (1968) Alexandrowicz (ed.) p. 95.
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Europe the principle was given effect, of the territories subject to the
League of Nations mandate, only Iraq became independent and the
Western allies appeared otherwise reluctant to grant independence to
their colonies.
However, if an Asian state was seeking independence from a non
European master difficult questions of self determination were not raised
and it was likely to receive outside recognition. For instance, the
overthrow of the Manchu Emperor in China in 1912 had the effect of
releasing Tibet and Mongolia from the control of China, as the latter's
rights were based on the personal bond betweenothe Dalai Lama and the
Manchu Emperors. In the treaty that established Tibet's independence
Tibet was to receive powerful support from Great Britain. For somewhat
similar reasons Nepal obtained its independence from China. Although
Nepal was "not active in many phases of international relations" she was
recognised by M.O. Hudson in a survey in the year 1935 as a potential
member of the League of Nations, but for her own reasons, she did not
take up membership. 60 Turbulent Afghanistan obtained control over her
external affairs as an outcome of the negotiations with Great Britain after
the Third Afghan War.
6'
Japan, the Asian state most able to champion self determination as a
principle of international law, was a subject of suspicion to other Asian
states. Her occupation of Korea and her unwillingness to terminate her
extraterritorial rights in China and the sourness of her relations with that
state during the nineteen twenties, which would end in Japanese
aggression in the early nineteen thirties, undermined any credibility that
she might have as the liberator of Asia from European colonial masters.
Although certain nationalistic Japanese visionaries might call for Japan
to "lift the virtuous banner of an Asian League and take the leadership in
a world federation" and visionaries with leanings towards communism
might describe her war in China "as a progressive one for the peoples of
Asia". Such declarations did not stir the imagination of the other peoples
of Asia.62
(iii) The League of Nations
Undoubtedly the greatest development for international law in the inter
war years was the establishment of the League of Nations. In 1914 few,
if any world statesmen were seeking to achieve global peace through the
medium of an international organisation. However, as the hope of a
60. Hudson, "Members of the League of Nations" (1935), 16 British Yearbook Int Law 130.
61. Sykes, A History of Afghanistan (1940) Vol. 2 p. 283-294.
62. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (1987) p. 178-179.
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speedy conclusion to the war died in the winter mud of France in 1914
the plans for a new international order took form. In June 1915 the
British League of Nations organisation was founded and the following
month a similar organisation was founded at Philadelphia in the United
States. When, in January 1918, President Wilson enumerated his famous
fourteen points, the establishment of the League was inevitable, whatever
the final outcome of the war.
In the creation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Asian states
had a presence without ever taking a leading role. The committee which
drafted the Covenant of the League of Nations was made up of nineteen
members, of which two were Japanese (Baron Makino and Viscount
Chinda), as befitting her role as a major power and one Chinese
(Wellington Koo). Perhaps the major contribution for the future of
international law, made by the Japanese, was the suggestion that the
preamble should endorse the equality of nations and the just treatment of
their nationals. 63 The suggestion was firmly rejected by the British and the
United States, but the idea upon which the suggestion was based would
appear again.
The other noteworthy fact, in the context of the creation of the League
of Nations for Asia, was the signature of the Covenant of the League, by
the Miharaja of Bikanis, to establish membership of the League by India.
In many ways this event marked the beginning of the surrender by the
Western powers of their colonial empires. As Pollock noted at the time
with great foresight, "for the future history of Indian constitutional
development it will be a capital fact".64
During the existence of the League of Nations five Asian states became
members at different times out of the 63 nations who, in total, were to
join. The Asian members of the League were Japan, China, Siam, India
and Afghanistan. All these states with the exception of Afghanistan were
founder members, the latter not becoming a member until 1934.
The Asian members of the League played a part in the running of the
League commensurate with their numbers and power and Japan, who
was a permanent member of the Council, was particularly involved.
Walters, perhaps the most competent historian of the League, records
that until the time of the notice of her withdrawal Japan played "a
zealous scrupulous part in this work" and that "her delegates had set a
standard of courtesy, industry and thoroughness which no others
surpassed and few equalled" which through "their courage and good
sense, helped the Council through difficult discussions, their patience for
63. Waiters, A History of the League of Nations (1950) p. 63.
64. Pollock, The League of Nations (1920) p. 82.
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example, in reconciling the division between the Germans and Poles over
minority questions had been the admiration of all".
65
Unfortunately, the most remembered contribution of Japan to the
League was her notice of withdrawal from it in March 1933 in response
to the League's reaction to her involvement in the affairs of China. In
1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and when the League passed a resolution
requiring her to withdraw her forces and to negotiate a settlement of her
disputes with China under the auspices of the League she announced her
withdrawal from the League. This act and the incapacity of the League
to effectively respond underlined the League's inability to fulfil its
purpose of promoting world peace and set a precedent that Germany,
Italy and Soviet Russia would later all exploit. Her withdrawal also
created a small body of literature that dealt with the legal technicalities of
withdrawing from the League and international organisations generally.
(iv) The Permanent Court of International Justice
The other great achievement in the inter war years for international law,
besides the establishment of the League of Nations, was the establishment
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in which achievement,
principally through Japan, Asia could claim a part. Adatci was the
Japanese representative to the ten men drafting Committee set up to draft
the Statute of the Court and he forcefully ensured that the voice of Asia
was heard. When discussing the drafting of Article 9 of the Statute, which
was to stipulate that the members of the Court should represent all the
principal civilisations, he was the sole Asian voice emphasising that "all
different kinds of civilisation must be taken into account, among them the
civilisation of the Far East, of which Japan was perhaps the principal
representative." 66
Adatci was to make a particular contribution to the Court in proposing
the appointment of ad hoc judges whenever a litigant state did not have
a representative on the Court and was a strong supporter of the view that
judges should distant themselves from national influences upon
appointment. Indeed, so connected with the establishment of the
Permanent Court was Adatci that he enjoyed the distinction of becoming
President of the Court in 1931 immediately upon his election as a Judge,
a feat which M.O. Hudson attributed to his "being prominently identified
with the Statue of the Court".
67
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In these years the few independent states of Asia were not active in
bringing cases before the Court although Japan did participate with
certain Western powers in bringing the Wimbledon 68 and Interpretation
of the Memmel Convention cases.69 In one case an Asian state was a
defendent and that was the case brought by Belgium against China after
China had declared the Sino-Belgium treaty of Friendship Commerce
and Navigation (1865) terminated by reason of the application of the
rebus sic stanibus doctrine. After the grant of interim measures by the
Court to Belgium the case was settled by the parties.70
(v) Developments Outside the League of Nations and the Court
It was also the Japanese invasion of Manchuria that was to be responsible
for her involvement in two of the most significant doctrinal developments
of the inter war years. The first was the Stimson doctrine. The second the
prohibition of aggression in international law.
In response to the Japanese military operations in Manchuria,
Stimson, the American Secretary of State, sent on the 7th January 1932,
a note to the Japanese and Chinese governments in which it was stated
that the American Government "cannot admit the legality of any
situation de facto nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement
entered into between these governments or agents thereof which may
impair the treaty rights of the United States ... and ... it does not intend
to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought
about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of
Paris 27 1928". This declaration was to be the first attempt at practical
enforcement of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
which prohibited the acquisition of title to territory by force and was to
widen the proscription set out therein in the non-recognition of treaty
rights of third parties arising out of or in connection with the use of force.
On 11 th March 1932, in respect of the ongoing military operations of
Japan in Manchuria the Assembly of the League adopted a resolution
which declared "that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of
Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be
brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of
Nations or to the Pact of Paris". Although in 1932 the obligation not to
recognise territory acquired by an illegal use of force may not have been
68. PCIJ Series A (1923) No. 1.
69. PCIJ Series A (1926) No. 8, (1928) Nos. 14, 16 and (1929) Nos. 18/19.
70. See Katte, "Denunciation of Treaty of 1865 between China and Belgium (Orders)"
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binding on all states these declarations, the responses by states thereto,
and subsequent state practice suggests that it now is.
71
Japan's military operations in Manchuria also exposed a strong
deficiency of the existing prohibition on such matters in international law.
The Covenant of the League prohibited "resort to war" by states and
provided that any state having resort to war without first of all complying
with the procedural limitations set out in the Covenant would be the
subject of objections by other states. These provisions of the Covenant
had been intended to eliminate war, but the interpretation given to the
meaning of "war" by China, Japan and other states, was that a state of
war existed only when the protagonists declared war and not when
military activities and war objectively occurred. Thus by the simple
expedient of neither protagonist declaring war on the other the
consequences under international law of the existence of the state of war
were avoided. Such practices led to the drafting and adoption of Article
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations which embodies the
contemporary prohibition on the use of force in international law. It is
very widely drafted so that states are required to refrain "in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state".
A doctrine to which many Asian states contributed is the doctrine of
"unequal treaties" and the somewhat similar doctrine of "unjust treaties".
Broadly this doctrine holds that a treaty which grants one state rights
against another and which does not give the latter reciprocal rights is
void. The doctrine was employed particularly by Japan and China in the
context of the treaties whereby extraterritorial rights had been granted to
European states particularly where the Asian state entered into the treaty
under the threat of force. Under the Communist regime in China the
doctrine of unequal treaties has been extended so that "treaties concluded
under former regimes which are incompatible with the new social system
... are void ab inito".7 2 Although the doctrine has had considerable
political usage its lack of precision, particularly in its most recent
extended form, means that it has rarely found supporters outside certain
Asian countries73 and as the historical forces which gave rise to it
dissipate it is unlikely to find a place in the text books of international
law.
74
71. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963), pp. 410-423.
72. Supra, note 13 p. 29.
73. Keeton, "The Revision Clause in Certain Chinese Treaties" (1929), 10 British Yearbook
Int Law 110.
74. On Chinese treaty practice generally see Chiu, The People's Republic of China and the
Law of Treaties (1972), p. 119.
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V. International Law in Asia 1939-1990
(i) Introduction
The Second World War finally undermined the great twin bastions of
colonialism, European moral superiority and European military strength.
For the second time in twenty years Europe had engaged in internecine
war, which discredited what remained of her claim to a superior
civilisation and throughout the Far East the armies and navies of Europe
had suffered initial disaster at the hands of an Asiatic Power. The British
capitulation at Singapore to the Japanese, for instance, being her most
resounding military debacle for centuries. At the same time the United
States of America and Russia, both antagonistic to colonialism, had
unquestionably replaced Europe as the worlds great centres of military
might and many European nations had incured a moral debt to their
former colonies for their aid during the war. Nevertheless, at the time the
European powers did not believe that the Second World War would
prove to be terminal for colonialism. As Churchill angrily announced to
Roosevelt in November 1942 in the deliberations of how the post war
world was to be restructured "I have not become the King's First
Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire". 5
(ii) Asia - Full Membership of the Family of Nations
Despite the intention of the European powers independence came
quickly after the end of the Second World War for most of the states of
Asia and for a variety of reasons. Nationalism, stirred up by the Japanese
against the European powers, the moral claims of Asian states to
independence through their contribution to the war effort of their
respective metropolitan power and the existence of an ancient civilisation
at a time when Europeans questioned the intrinsic merit of their own led
to the road to independence.
Accordingly, by the time of the eighth and final edition of Oppenheim
in 1954 there were to be listed no less than twelve states from Asia who
could claim to be a member of the Family of Nations.76 The new states
which had formerly been colonial territories and which obtained their
independence immediately after the Second World War were the
Phillipines (1946), India (1947), Pakistan (1947), Sri Lanka (1948),
Burma (1948), North and South Korea (1948), which alone had been
subject to an Asiatic master and these states were to be followed in the
75. Roberts, Europe 1880-1945 p. 46.
76. Oppenheim, International Law (1954) 8th ed. p. 257.
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years to come by Laos (1954), Cambodia (1954), Vietnam (1954),
Malaya (1957), Singapore (1965) and most recently by Brunai (1984).
Today only Hong Kong, shortly to be returned to China, and Macao
remain subject to non Asian States.
At the same time not only did the breakdown of colonialism lead to
the creation of new members of the Family of Nations, but internal
division along political and religious lines of the new states has led to a
further multiplication of the actors from Asia on the international legal
scene. On political grounds, in 1948, Korea was split into two states
North Korea and South Korea, a fate that Vietnam was also to
experience for a time. In China the Communist revolution was to lead to
the creation of Taiwan as a sovereign state as the home of the
Nationalists. In 1971 difficulties (religious) in Pakistan led to the creation
of Bangladesh.
Further, the inherent instability of the region led to changes in the
numbers of independent sovereign states in Asia. Tibet, for instance, was
absorbed into China in 1950, while earlier, in 1946, after a plebscite,
Mongolia was recognised by China as an independent state.
The creation of this powerful cluster of states soon after the end of the
Second World War has great potential significance for the development
of international law. The states of Asia with their very different religious,
cultural and legal backgrounds present a considerable stimulus for change
to the principles of international law, as writers of the time noted, not
always favourable.77 Accordingly, the remainder of this article will briefly
consider what impact the states of Asia have had on international law in
the last forty years.
(iii) Asian States and the United Nations
The forum provided by United Nations has been the means through
which the states of Asia have been most able to articulate their views on
international law and through the means of resolutions of the General
Assembly give effect to them. The resolutions of the General Assembly
on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (1960), Permanent Sovereignty over National
Resources (1962), the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed
and Ocean Floor (1970), the Declaration on Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States (1970), the Declaration of a New
77. This literature is referred to and considered from an Asian perspective in Anand, "Role of
the New Asian-African Countries in the Present International Legal Order" (1962), 56 Am. J.
InL Law 382 and Anand, "Asian-African States and International Law" (1966), 15 LC.L.Q.
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International Economic Order (1974) and the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (1974) were all passed with the firm support
of all Asian states, save in respect of certain by Japan and all are
documents of the first importance for contemporary international law. In
1966, looking perceptively to the future, Anand foresaw that the third
world states were to be "the great champions of the new international
order based upon the principle of the United Nations Charter". However,
in the early post war years Asia was to view the United Nations less
positively.
The Charter of the United Nations was drafted without significant
contributions from Asian states. Japan who had, as a great power,
influenced directly the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
as a defeated power was not present at San Francisco and when the
victorious allies met there in 1945 Asia was represented only by British
India, the Phillipines, Afghanistan and Nationalist China out of the fifty
odd participants. Thus, as one Asian commentator noted, Asian views
did not find "adequate or appropriate expression in the provisions of the
Charter" 78 and the failure of Article 73 to condemn colonialism in a clear
cut fashion was considerd to be particularly illustrative of this
inadequacy. Nevertheless, the Charter was to depart from the unanimity
principle which had applied in the Assembly of the League for the
passing of resolutions of the General Assembly and this development
together with the deadlock caused by the great power veto in the Security
Council, was to give the General Assembly potential for law making
purposes which has facilitated Asian involvement in the making of
international law.
However, though Asian states had generally quickly obtained their
independence in 1945, for the decade following 1945 they were unable
to significantly influence the United Nations. There were two principal
reasons for this lack of influence. First, the cold war was at its height and
there was little scope for third world nations to shape international events
when the world was divided up into two great and hostile camps.
Second, membership of the United Nations had become subject to the
cold war and the effect was to prevent many of the newly independent
Asian states joining the United Nations as the Great Powers strove for a
majority or to keep their majority in the General Assembly. Until
December 1955 only Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and Pakistan had been
allowed to join the United Nations from Asia in addition to the original
members and only in that month did a further 16 states as part of the so
78. Brohi, "Five Lectures on Asia and the United Nations" (1961), 102 Hague Recueil 128.
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called "package deal" become members. Of these 16 new states four
more were Asian being Ceylon, Nepal, Laos and Cambodia. If one
considers that it was not until the following year that Russia refrained
from exercising its veto to permit Japan to join the United Nations and
that the Peoples Republic of China was still outside and seeking to
establish its own rival organisation, Asia's lack of success in using the
United Nations as a tool for the elaboration of its own norms of
international law in comparison with later decades is not difficult to
understand.
Nevertheless, in these early years of the United Nations, even if the
Asian states were numerically unable to achieve definite changes in
international law, they were able to raise the issue of colonialism
consistently and by their own experience, including the use of force by
national liberation movements, provided the basis for later developments.
In the early 1950's, for instance, the states of Asia were amongst those
who tried to place for debate before the Council and General Assembly,
the issues of decolonisation in Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia and other areas
of North Africa and sought to expand the range of information to be
supplied by colonial powers to the Secretary General pursuant to Article
73(e) of the Charter.
From the 1960's onwards, in conjunction with the newly independent
states in other parts of the world, Asian states were able to play their role
in passing the important resolutions of the General Assembly which we
have already noted. First, the declaration on the Granting Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples was passed which began "the
accelerated development of the right to self determination within the
organs of the United Nations and beyond". 79 This development through
to the Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States
and other legally constitutive acts led to the principle of self
determination evolving in the space of forty years from "a principle of
political thought to a right in international law". 80 Nevertheless, the
difficulty identified by Syatauw in 1961 of how to reconcile the
aspirations of minority groups with the principles of self determination
has not been met by the states of Asia.8
In the economic field as members of what became known as the
Group of 77, the states of Asia were able to contribute to the revision of
79. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (1988)
p. 69.
80. Ibid, p. 78.
81. Syatauw, Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International Law
(1961) p. 235.
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the laws on the expropriation of foreign assets, the establishment of
UNCTAD and the Declaration of a new International Economic Order
by their voting numbers. In these developments certain Asian states
played substantial roles, such as the Phillipines and India in seeking to
implement the Declaration of the New International Economic Order.
However, it is important not to over emphasise the global Asian
contribution to international law in this respect, apart from individual
states and not only because of the doubt and difficulty associated with the
legal status of the New International Legal Order.
First, perhaps the most vociferous of the third world nations in support
of the New Order are from South America or North Africa or the Middle
East. Second, China refused an invitation to join the Group of 77 and
adopted, unhelpfully, what one commentator has called a "passive and
supportive posture" rather than be directly involved.82 Third, although
the population of Asia is very large the number of countries it comprises
is comparatively small and within the Group of 77 at the 31st of
December 1977, after the principal measures creating the new economic
order had been passed, only 19 of the 115 members of the Group were
from Asia. Little attempt seems to have been made to seek to introduce
or consider the merits of weighted voting in international organisations
by Asia. The feeling persists that in the United Nations Asia has not
achieved as much as she might.
In respect of the legal significance to be given to resolutions of the
General Assembly, there appears to be no universal Asian view, but the
emphasis is towards their legal efficacy, but more recently they have been
viewed by China as "a kind of legal form of agreement between member
states".83 Wang Tieya, perhaps China's leading international lawyer, has
suggested that although the resolutions of the General Assembly are not
legally binding they may if they "creatively clarify new principles of
international law" give rise to a form of estoppel." Anand of India has
been willing to attach greater legal efficacy to resolutions of the General
Assembly although the exact legal mechanics are a little unclear. In
Anand's view resolutions of the General Assembly act by "the collective
legitimation of certain claims, actions and policies" and "have a force
which is much more than recommendatory". 8 Jewa, writing in Malaya,
82. Kim, China, The United Nations and the World Order(1979) p. 333.
83. See China Daily Oct. 25 1985 p. 4 cited in Yuan, "China's Challenge to Traditional
International Law" (1987), 10 Dalhousie LJ. 9.
84. Wang, The Third World and International Law in the Structure and Process of
International Law (1983) Macdonald & Johnson (eds.) p. 964.
85. Anand, International Law and the Developing Countries (1987) p. 134-5.
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in his affirmation of the right of the majority to create international law
would appear to be of the same view.
86
(iv) The Law of Peaceful Co-existence and the Pancha Shila
In 1961 Syatauw, in his analysis of the contribution of Asia to
international law, identified the law of peaceful co-existence as one such
area.87 Although the law of peaceful co-existence in origin was very much
a product of the Soviet Union in an era when the inevitable conflict
between East and West decreed by Marxism was postponed because of
the mutual assurance of destruction by nuclear weapons, in Asia a
distinctive slant was given to the doctrine.
In Asia the doctrine became known as the Pancha Shila and it was the
premiers of China and India who first gave the doctrine formulation in
1954 in the context of a treaty concerned with Tibet. The Five Principles
of Peaceful Co-existence are: - 1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity
and sovereignty; 2. Non aggression; 3. Non interference in each other's
internal affairs; 4. Equality and mutual benefit; and 5. Peaceful co-
existence.
The doctrine quickly gained popularity in Asia, perhaps reaching its
culmination at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and by 1963 Professor
Brownlie was able to produce an impressive list of countries who
suscribed to its tenents.88 The doctrine was particularly important because
its conception coincided with a time when many states were outside the
United Nations and for these states it offered an equivalent to the Charter
in setting out basic ground rules for international relations. Brownlie, for
instance, considered that it was probable that "they now rank with and
supplement the United Nations Charter and the Kellogg-Briand Pact".89
In recent years however with the entrance of nearly all states into the
United Nations, and the substitution of the law of co-operation for that
of co-existence as the aspiratory basis for relations between states, the
doctrine of peaceful co-existence has declined considerably in
importance. Nevertheless, the doctrine was one of the forces that gave rise
to the United Nations General Assembly on the Declaration on Friendly
Relations and Cooperation (1970).
86. Jewa, "The Third World and International Law" (1977), 4 Journal of Malaysian and
Comparative Law 245,
87. Supra, note 81 p. 234, The others were (1) the process of transition of colonies to
independent states (2) self determination and (3) neutralism.
88. Supra note 71 p. 123-126.
89. Ibid., p. 119.
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(v) Asia and the International Court of Justice
Traditionally, the states of Asia, along with the other members of the
Third World have been suspicious of the International Court of Justice in
particular and judicial settlement in general. As professor Wang notes,
this suspicion is based on both the cultural bias of the Court as an
embodiment of Western thinking and its composition, its procedure and
the substantive law it applies.90 It is important though to note that this
suspicion is deeper in certain parts of Asia than others and as the
composition of the court changes and more fully reflects the place of Asia
in the legal systems of the world it may be dispelled.
Historically the objection to the Court on the basis of its failure to
reflect fairly the role of Asian states in the international legal order is
difficult to rebut. Excluding the judges of the Court sitting at the 31st July
1989, of its 55 previous members only 791 had come from Asia although
some of these, such as judge Tanka, have made particularly distinguished
contributions to its judgements. 92 However, today three,93 or one fifth of
the Court's members, are drawn from Asia and in light of recent
campaigns it is difficult to forsee an election in which candidates from
China, Japan and India will not be elected, guaranteeing Asia a bed rock
representation.
Notwithstanding the composition of the Court, certain Asian states
have been willing at least to try its services. India, for instance, has
appeared in three cases before the Court and Pakistan two, but by 1986
only 4 of the 55 cases to come before the Court had involved Asian
states.94 Similarly, it is the states of India and Pakistan and also the
Phillipines and to a lesser extent Thailand and Ceylon who have been
willing to enter into treaties, with a clause providing for reference to the
Court of all disputes arising out of the treaty and its application. The
proportion of states in Asia accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court under Article 36(2) of its Statute seems generally to be in accord
with other areas of the world although certain states such as India have
made substantial reservations.
90. Supra note 84 p. 973.
91. Being Bengzon (Phillipines), Mo (China), Sir Bengal Rau (India), Tanka (Japan), Koo
(China), Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) and Singh (India).
92. Jenks, "Ideal and Idealism in International Law" (1972), 16 Japanese Annual InL Law 2
and also Hussein, Dissenting and Separate Opinions at the World Court (1984).
93. Oda, (Japan), Ni (China), Pathak (India).
94. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Appeal relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v.
Pakistan) and Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India).
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Perhaps the fiercest Asian state critic of the International Court of
Justice is the Communist Government of the Peoples Republic of China.
The Nationalist Government had been willing to enter into treaties with
provision for recourse to the Court in the event of a dispute. However the
Peoples Republic has firmly denounced these provisions and in the
multilateral treaties that it has ratified it has made reservations against
clauses providing for disputes arising under such treaties to be referred to
the Court. Instead in treaties with non communist states China has
developed the provision that disputes shall be settled by "peaceful
negotiation", while treaties with communist states normally have no
dispute settlement procedure probably because disputes with ideological
neighbours do not occur. 95
The Chinese attitude to the legal process is one of some ambivalence.
Although not recognising that decisions of the Court are binding on it or
creative of international law, the Chinese have adopted a pragmatic
approach to the decisions of judicial tribunals which has been
characterised as one of "pick and choose". That is China "picks what
serves its own interests", affirming the wisdom of the pronouncements of
the Court when those views coincide with its own, but otherwise rejects
them. However, this robust view of the decisions of the Court may be
softening in light of the election of Professor Ni Zhengyu to the Court as
is revealed in the recent writings of certain Chinese publicists. 96
(vi) Asia and the Law of the Sea
The interests of all the states of Asia have not often been mutually
compatible in the development of the sea. For instance, technologically
advanced Japan does not have the same interests in deepsea bed mining
and the Area as defined by the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) as the Asian members of the Group of 77
and the interests of the archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the
Phillipines have not always coincided with the interests of land locked
Laos and states bordering on enclosed or semi enclosed seas such as
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia and Vietnam. Yet not
withstanding these differences certain Asian states particularly the
archipelagic states have made very substantial contributions to the
development of the law of the sea.
95. Matsudaira, "Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes and the People's Republic of
China" (1971), 15 Japanese Annual InL Law 54.
96. Chiu, "Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law in the Post-Moa Era 1978-1987"
(1987), 21 International Lawyer, 1144.
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Perhaps the most striking contribution of Asian states to the law of the
sea is the concept of the special rights of archipelagic states over the
surrounding waters set out in Part IV of The Law of the Sea Convention.
The idea that archipelagic states should have sovereignty over the waters
lying within straight baselines drawn from one outer most point to
another in an island chain was affirmed by the Phillipines in a Note
Verbale of 7th March 1955 to the Secretary General of the United
Nations and the view was reinforced by a communique of 13th
December 1957 of Indonesia. 97 The concept was raised again at the
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea (1958), but the great
maritime powers were against it. As one sympathetic reviewer of the time
noted the most that had been achieved by raising the concept at the
Geneva Conferences was that one or two minor maritime powers
demonstrated "at least some understanding" of the position.98 The
achievement of the Phillipines and Indonesia in establishing the
archipelagic states concept as a doctrine of not only the Law of the Sea
Treaty, but also customary international law in the face of the opposition
of the maritime powers is a considerable achievement and perhaps the
most clear cut example of a concept of international law bearing an
almost exclusive Asian hallmark.
Contributions to the law of the sea have also been made by the states
of Asia in other areas. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in their
concern to regulate the Malacca straits contributed to Part III of the Law
of the Sea Treaty on straits used for international navigation and
Malaysia also contributed to the provisions in the Treaty on marine
pollution. Further many of the leading personalities of the UNCLOS III
have come from Asia. Tommy Koh from Singapore was the second
chairman of the Conference succeeding Amersinghe of Sri Lanka. Indeed
UNCLOS III has been a stage, as we will see, where many of the jurists
of Asia have been able to display their abilities to the community of
international lawyers assisting in the establishment of Asian scholars as
among the corpus of the leading scholars of international law.
Generally the states of Asia provided a substantial part of the votes in
favour of extending the sovereignty of coastal states over adjacent waters
without being at the very forefront of the movement, save in connection
with archipelagic waters. For instance Indonesia claimed a 12 mile
97. See Kittichaisaree, The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in South East
Asia (1987) p. 153. See also O'Connell The International Law of the Sea (1982), pp. 236-258
for the standing of the archipelagic state doctrine in international law prior to its development
by the Phillipines.
98. Supra, note 81 p. 199.
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territorial sea in 1957 following the lead of certain South American states
and during the nineteen sixties most of the other coastal states of South
East Asia also claimed a twelve mile territorial sea at a time when the
maritime powers were still trying to uphold the three mile rule.
Somewhat similarly once the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) had been formulated by certain African states, the states of Asia
thereafter made declarations in respect of their own EEZ's, although
Japan at least thought this a negative development.
The recent developments in the law of the sea also gives opportunity
to the states of Asia to make further contributions to international law in
application of these new developments. The declaration of territorial seas,
continental shelves and EEZ's, particularly in the South China Sea,
means that considerable legal skills and the application of legal principle
will be needed to settle the various boundaries. In 1988 reviewers of
ocean boundaries in South East Asia noted that seventeen bilaterial
ocean boundary agreements had been entered into, but of these fourteen
involved the state of Indonesia two of which provided for interesting
transboundary arrangements. In North East Asia the same reviewers
found only two bilaterial agreements had been entered into.99
Considerable scope thus remains for the states of Asia to make a real
contribution to ocean boundary delimitations, but it is interesting that it
appears that it is the provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty concerning
compulsory dispute settlement that render that treaty unacceptable to
China. 0
(vii) Asia and International Organisations
In 1958 Fifield noted the obstacles towards achieving regional unity in
South East Asia. In his view "racial and religious, linguistic and cultural
diversity characterizes the people. Geographic barriers add to the
problems of communication and transportation. Old animosities have
lingered among the peoples of the area".' 0' Today these problems still
remain and if we magnify the region he was referring to so as to include
the entire Asian continent we might add the difficulties arising out of a
clash of political philosophies, disputes over territorial boundaries and
rivalry for regional supremacy.
99. Rhee & McAulay, Ocean Boundary Issues in Ocean Boundary Making (1988) Johnston
& Saudners (eds.) p. 74.
100. Yuan, The New Convention on the Law of the Sea from the Chinese Perspective in
Consensus and Confrontation. The United Nations and the Law of the Sea Convention (1984)
van Dyke (ed.) p. 207-208.
101. Fifield, The Diplomacy of South EastAsia 1945-1958 (1958), p. 451.
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Notwithstanding these difficulties efforts have been made to establish
regional organisations, particularly by India. In 1947, for instance, she
convened the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, the final
resolution of which was to agree to establish an Asian Relations
Organisation and in 1955 she was one of the powers that sponsored the
Asian African Conference at Bandung. One of its purposes was to
encourage co-operation between the states attending. Nevertheless, a
truly regional organisation has failed to emerge in Asia and this failure
has, as some commentators have noted, 02 reduced the prospect of solving
the regions many territorial disputes by depriving the protagonists of a
forum for the peaceful settlement of their disputes and the exertion of
diplomatic pressure.
A potentially more fruitful means by which some of the states of Asia
may contribute to the law of international organisations is the
establishment by the states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore
and Thailand of The Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) of
which Brunei is now also a member. ASEAN is a subregional
organisation founded in 1967 for the purpose, inter alia, of the
acceleration of economic growth, social progress and the cultural
development of the region, mutual collaboration, promotion of peace and
common training and research in education, the professions, technology
and adminstration. However it must be said that ASEAN has not been an
unqualified success as one well placed reviewer of its first ten years noted
candidly "its words are not equalled by action, its agreements and
announcements are not immediately followed by implementation.
Except for a very few resolutions, commitments and directive have yet to
be matched by accomplishments". 10 3 Subsequent practice indicates that
ASEAN has a long way to go before its achieves that degree of
integration achieved by the European Economic Community. 104
If a regional government forum has not emerged the states of Asia
have since independence increasingly joined and participated in many of
the existing and post war international organisations both governmental
and non-governmental. Further, they have benefited by the greater
representation given to the personnel of third world countries in the
Secretariat of the United Nations and other international organisations.105
In their participation, however, in international organisations, a clear
102. Day, (ed.) Border and Territorial Disputes (1982) p. 235.
103. Tolentino, "Challenge to ASEAN" (1977), 6 Phillipine Yearbook Int Law 112.
104. Shearer, "Association of South East Asia Nations" (1983), 6 Encyclopedia of Public InL
Law 27.
105. Peterson, The GeneralAssembly in World Politics (1986) p. 470.
International Law in Asia
division has emerged between those countries having communist forms
of government and those not.
The Asian states with communist governments such as China, North
Korea and Vietnam have been less willing to join international
organisations than communist forms of government in other parts of the
world. China for instance during the early 1960's was a member, but of
one or two intergovernmental organisations. Nevertheless, if involvement
in international organisations is to some degree an indication of a region's
ability to direct the development of international law, however crude, it
is fair to note that even states such as India and Japan who have
wholeheartedly entered into the work of the international organisations
still remain less involved than the traditional leading members of the
Family of Nations.
(viii) Asia and the Literature of International Law
Since the Second World War there has been a considerable increase in
publications by Asian scholars particularly those from India. For instance
one book reviewer in 1966 noted that there was already twelve text
books on international law offering an overview of the subject and he
was reviewing two new contributions.1 06 Nevertheless the labours of all
Asian nations in the field of international law have not been equal.
Chinese international lawyers for instance suffered severely during the
cultural revolution and well nigh all their work in the field of
international law ceased. A generation of lawyers was lost and only since
1980 and the establishment of the Chinese Society of International Law
in that year has work commenced again. There are however early signs
that with a changing political climate events may not lead to the lasting
advancement of international law in China and Chinese legal scholars
also face the challenge of defending Marxist-Leninist legal thought in
international law when it has been renounced by the Soviet Union its
leading protogonist.
The opportunity for Asian scholars to have their works published has
been increased by the establishment of a number of periodicals devoted
to international law in a variety of Asian countries. These include the
Indian Journal of International Law (1960), the Japanese Annual of
International Law (1957), the Chinese Year Book of International Law
and Affairs based in Taiwan (known as the Annals of the Chinese Society
of International Law between 1964-1981), a journal since 1982 from the
Peoples Republic of China in Chinese and the Phillipine Yearbook of
106. Bains, (1966), 6 Indian Journal ofInL Law 263-4.
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International Law (1966) with its apparent commitment to the new
international economic legal order. There have also been established in
Asia journals of comparative law which carry articles of interest to
international lawyers and journals concerned with international affairs
such as the Indian Yearbook of International Affairs (1952).
From their publications a number of Asian jurists have established
considerable reputations in the field of international law. Of these
perhaps the most well known are Nagendra Singh principally in
international law for his work on the history of international law in India
and disarmament, Anand for his publications on the law of the sea and
the new international legal order, Choo ho Park and Oda both also
principally for their work on the law of the sea, Amerasingh for inter alia
his massive work on the international civil service and his contribution as
chairman to UNCLOS III and Wang Tieya.
In addition the Asian Legal Consultative Committee was established in
1957 consisting of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan and
Syria to deal with specific and general problems of international law and
to permit a common exchange of views. This Committee was
transformed into the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee in
1958. Although the work carried out by the Committee has been
extensive as one friendly observer has noted "its activities and
contribution need to be publicized widely or paid more attention than has
been the case so far"107 and a lack of publicity outside their own
countries, for whatever reason, has limited the impact of much of the
work of Asian jurists on international law.
VI. Conclusion
We have seen that through history as in other regions of the world Asia
has brought into being rules and practices that look familiar to
international lawyers. However, in Asia as in other areas of the world
these practices were never systemised or elaborated into a theory which
later generations could develop. It was in sixteenth and seventeenth
century Europe that some creative spark was to ignite which fueled by
the developments in travel, commerce, political sovereignty and printing
would issue in the present international legal system. The claims of recent
Indian jurists appear over high.
Although at its commencement international law did apply to all
nations including the ancient states of Asia, the practices of such states by
107. Sarin, "The Asian African States and the development of International Law," [1983]
Hague Recueil Colloquy 132.
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reason of geography, theology and historical outlook were either in the
wider world unknown or unsuitable for the development of international
law. Accordingly as the centuries passed and inter state practice within
Europe progressed under economic and commercial pressures, political
alliances and technical developments, European international law grew
up which by the magnitude of its practice and the rise of juridical
positivism thrust aside and substituted itself for the international law of
the founding fathers. Asia was not a subject of this transformed legal
system.
From the late nineteenth century onwards Asia began to re-establish its
membership in the Family of Nations. First Japan was admitted and
China, Siam and Tibet were allowed to play a part in the great Hague
Peace Conferences that marked the beginning of this century although
doubt still hung over their status. Then First World War and finally the
Second World War upset the moral superiority of the colonial powers. In
the late nineteen forties and nineteen fifties most of the states of Asia
obtained their independence.
Today there are over twenty three independent Asian states and it is
through the United Nations that these states have chosen to principally
exercise their law making capacity. The states of Asia have contributed
significantly to the law of decolonization, and the weight of their
combined vote (Japan excluded) has been felt in the Declaration of a
New International Economic Order, Declaration of Permanent
Sovereignty over National Resources, the Law of the Sea and the
Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation. Further, their
involvement in international organisations and in the provision of
members to the International Court of Justice, the possibility of
additional contributions is suggested.
Nevertheless, although it has only been possible in a paper of this
length to focus on a few topics the feeling persists that Asia with over 50
per cent of the world's population concentrated in about 15 per cent of
the earth's land surface is yet to make her real contribution to
international law. Although it is true that certain areas of international
law by reason of wealth and resources are more appropriate for the great
powers, such as the law of space, the initiation of concepts and their
wholehearted advocacy by Asian states in respect of matters relevant to
Asia has not been marked.
For example legal procedures for the settlement of boundary disputes
of which in Asia there are at least fourteen, 08 some of very considerable
108. Supra note 102 pp. 234-331.
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importance, have been little advanced and with a population of over two
billion, voting systems based on population and human rights might have
received more attention. In that area of perhaps her greatest interest the
economic sphere, the major innovations appear to come from elsewhere.
The common heritage principle derives from Malta on the European
fringe and the working out of the law of expropriation of foreign national
assets has principally been in the Middle East. Neither have new ventures
in international organisation flourished in Asia. Only in the development
of the archipelagic state concept is there a doctrine that Asia can claim as
her own.
For the author this lack of a distinctive contribution by Asia to
international law is one of some regret. With such antiquity of
civilisation, diversity and richness of culture I came to the preparation of
this article expecting to discover a rich deposit of new ideas and concerns
for the better development of international law. Other regions of the
world such as South America, also late comers to the modern system of
international law, have made their particular contribution, but Asia
appears yet to take up the challenge. It remains to be seen whether in the
next millenium the challenge will be met and the richness of traditions
and perspectives of Asia will be reflected in the Asian contribution to the
international legal order.
